The old federalism cracking?

If we look at state GDP/capita, counting up from the lowest GDP/capita state (Mississippi) to the state ranked 30th (Utah), we find that Trump won 18 of those 21 states (if we account for Maine’s split electoral vote in 2016, 18+ of those states were Trump states). Senate representation from those states is 31 Republican, 11 Democrat (counting King of ME as a Democrat). On the other side of the equation, of the top 15 states in GDP/capita, 11 supported Clinton. Three of the Trump states in the top 15 are Alaska, Wyoming, and North Dakota, which would be poor on this measure if not for the good luck of sitting on fossil fuel deposits. The other is Texas, also heavily dependent on fossils but far more diverse economically. Senate representation from those high GDP/capita states is 22-8 Democratic. If you drop out the three small petro states the Senate margin is 21-3.  It is well-known that GOP-leaning states are by far the biggest winners when we look at federal dollars flowing to states compared to federal revenues coming from states. Of the top 10 “winners” (led by South Carolina, which gets around $8 back for every dollar paid in) nine were Trump states. The big picture question is whether you can forever shackle the most dynamic and economically vibrant and cosmopolitan regions of the country to the poorest, while—through the various mechanisms of our politics that empower rural areas vis-à-vis urban areas—imposing the politics of the poorer regions on the nation as a whole. There’s a really interesting puzzle here for the economic historians and historical institutionalists out there. At what point do the underlying economic dynamics so far outstrip the political institutions that the whole thing falls apart?  

Do we have comparative cases in which the more economically vibrant regions of a country find themselves disempowered by institutions and rules that privilege poorer and declining areas?  (I know a bit about the power of agricultural interests in some places, but that’s as far as my knowledge goes.)  How do these tensions play?  

In the US, I wonder if there’s a radical break in the nature of federalism coming. The mid-20th century pushes for decentralization came from racists, and then, a bit later, from conservatives, often from relatively poor states, who would soon learn that they needed the Yankees very badly.  What happens when the impetus for decentralization comes from the major population centers and core economic drivers of the country?