If we look at state GDP/capita, counting up from the lowest
GDP/capita state (Mississippi) to the state ranked 30th (Utah), we find that
Trump won 18 of those 21 states (if we account for Maine’s split electoral vote
in 2016, 18+ of those states were Trump states). Senate representation from
those states is 31 Republican, 11 Democrat (counting King of ME as a Democrat).
On the other side of the equation, of the top 15 states in GDP/capita, 11
supported Clinton. Three of the Trump states in the top 15 are Alaska, Wyoming,
and North Dakota, which would be poor on this measure if not for the good luck
of sitting on fossil fuel deposits. The other is Texas, also heavily dependent on fossils but far more diverse economically. Senate representation from those high
GDP/capita states is 22-8 Democratic. If you drop out the three small petro states the
Senate margin is 21-3. It is well-known that GOP-leaning states are by
far the biggest winners when we look at federal dollars flowing to states
compared to federal revenues coming from states. Of the top 10 “winners” (led
by South Carolina, which gets around $8 back for every dollar paid in) nine
were Trump states. The big picture question is whether you can forever shackle
the most dynamic and economically vibrant and cosmopolitan regions of the
country to the poorest, while—through the various mechanisms of our politics
that empower rural areas vis-à-vis urban areas—imposing the politics of the
poorer regions on the nation as a whole. There’s a really interesting puzzle
here for the economic historians and historical institutionalists out there. At
what point do the underlying economic dynamics so far outstrip the political
institutions that the whole thing falls apart?
Do
we have comparative cases in which the more economically vibrant regions of a
country find themselves disempowered by institutions and rules that privilege
poorer and declining areas? (I know a bit about the power of agricultural
interests in some places, but that’s as far as my knowledge goes.) How do
these tensions play?
In
the US, I wonder if there’s a radical break in the nature of federalism coming. The mid-20th century pushes for
decentralization came from racists, and then, a bit later, from conservatives, often from
relatively poor states, who would soon learn that they needed the Yankees very badly. What happens when the impetus for decentralization comes from the major population centers and core economic drivers of the country?
